A Sociological Analysis of Weak Ranking Incentives—Taking Environmental Protection Agencies as an Example

By / 02-01-2016 /

Social Sciences in China (Chinese Edition)

No.1, 2016

 

A Sociological Analysis of Weak Ranking Incentives—Taking Environmental Protection Agencies as an Example

(Abstract)

 

Lian Hong

 

We have made a close observation of the course of year-end assessment by an environmental protection bureau in three consecutive years in a certain city, emphatically analyzing the cause both of formation and long-term existence of weak ranking incentives. The political course to complete the sequential application between task logic, incentive logic and political coalition logic is the process of formation of weak ranking incentives. Moreover, weak ranking incentives have existed and been effective for long just because in comparison with strong incentives, it can satisfy external bureaucratic requirements in form, while can be adjusted inside in essence, ensuring flexible authoritative dominance and meanwhile showing adaptability and autonomy. Besides, weak ranking incentives are also helpful in facilitating cooperation at the same level rather than excessive competition, shaping loose connection between higher and lower levels rather than close relationship, and avoiding external incentives from excessively supplanting internal ones.