Social Sciences in China 2014

Vol. 35, No. 2, 2014

 

A Legal Structure for Limiting the Agency Cost of Stock Rights Transfer

(Abstract)

 

Luo Peixin

 

The unilateral disposition of stock rights’ voting rights detracts from the welfare of the other shareholders. Contractual arrangements restricting or prohibiting the transfer of stock rights under the capital majority rule may infringe upon shareholders’ right of withdrawal, further weakening stock market constraints on senior management and indirectly raising the agency cost of management abuse of power for private ends. In creating a legal structure for stock rights transfer, we need to find an appropriate balance between freedom of contract, capital majority rule and reduction of agency costs. Judges should determine that the transfer of voting rights is invalid in order to ensure that voting rights match residual claim rights and maintain the constraints on senior management represented by shareholder voting rights. The general prohibition of stock rights transfer in the articles of association blocks shareholders’ right of withdrawal; this is not conducive to restraining potential abuses of power on the part of senior management and should be made invalid. Judges must differentiate between long- and short-term contracts and the initial and revised clauses of the articles of association in order to distinguish between the efficacy of different arrangements limiting transfer of stock rights as laid down in the articles of association.