Tan Qixiang’s scholarly interpretation of ‘Historical China’
FILE PHOTO: A bronze li vessel with beast-like motifs from the Shang Dynasty, preserved in the Shanghai Museum
The Historical Atlas of China (8 volumes), edited by Chinese historian and historical geographer Tan Qixiang, stands as the most influential achievement in the field of Chinese historical geography in the 20th century. The project was launched in the spring of 1955, initially with the modest goal of revising and redrawing the Historical Atlas of Successive Dynasties by Yang Shoujing, a scholar of the late Qing Dynasty. As Tan later recalled, however, the team quickly realized, “Limiting our maps to the scope of Yang’s atlas simply would not work,” and that “we cannot equate historical China with just the Central Plains dynasties. We need to map all of China, the entirety of Chinese history.” The project was accordingly renamed the Historical Atlas of China, marking a fundamental shift in perspective. This redefinition broadened the understanding of China’s historical territory and deepened the conceptual meaning of “China” itself.
‘Naturally formed China’
After careful deliberation, Tan proposed that the atlas adopt the territorial scope of the Qing Dynasty—from the mid-18th century to the 1840s, prior to the Opium War and foreign imperialist encroachments—as the standard for “historical China.” He explained: “The territory of China before 1840 represents the naturally formed China, shaped over thousands of years of historical development.”
This notion of a “naturally formed China” underscores the internal logic of China’s historical geography, reflecting a profound, long-standing integration mechanism that transcended ethnic and regional boundaries. In his essay “The Chinese Interaction Sphere and the Foundation of Civilization,” K.C. Chang observed that around 4000 BCE, a significant and enduring process began, lasting over a millennium. Neolithic cultures from various regions became increasingly interconnected, sharing common archaeological elements. These shared features drew them into a vast cultural network, where internal cultural similarities were qualitatively stronger than those with external societies. Chang argued that this “cultural network” formed the foundational matrix of what would eventually become China.
A distinctive artifact within this cultural network—reflecting these shared elements—was the li vessel [an ancient cooking vessel characterized by a round or oval body and three hollow legs]. Archaeologist Su Bingqi noted that no comparable vessel has been found in other parts of the world, yet in China, its distribution was remarkably broad and enduring. First appearing in the Longshan culture during the late Neolithic, the li flourished during the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties, before gradually being replaced by the fu vessel [the ancient cooking cauldron with flat or slightly rounded base] in the late Warring States period. The li had a lifespan of roughly 3,000 years. It originated in the middle reaches of the Yellow River and gradually spread—southward to the Yangtze River basin and northward to the steppe regions. Given its unique form and complex production process, the li was unlikely to have emerged independently in multiple places; its wide distribution likely stemmed from cultural diffusion and imitation.
This long arc of development laid a deep cultural foundation for later historical periods. The geographical space that would come to be known as “China” was thus the natural, cumulative outcome of civilizational evolution.
By distinguishing the geographical identity of “China” from the political contours of the Central Plains dynasties, Tan offered a foundational insight—one that would become the philosophical cornerstone of the Historical Atlas of China.
China persisted through historical shifts
In the course of China’s historical development, cycles of unification and division occurred frequently. Yet these cycles were not merely repetitive—each new unification typically resulted in territorial expansion. The first unification in Chinese history occurred under the Qin and Han dynasties. When the Qin unified China, its northern frontier extended only to the Qin Great Wall, and its western reach scarcely surpassed the Yellow River. During the Han Dynasty, however, the realm expanded westward to the Yumen Pass and into the Huangshui River basin on the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau—already an extension beyond the Qin. The Sui and Tang dynasties extended this unified territory even further, though not to the scale later achieved under the Qing Dynasty.
Each successive unification brought with it a broader territorial scope, culminating in the Qing Dynasty’s consolidation of the largest unified area in Chinese history. This territorial extent was not simply the result of Qing military expansion, but rather the outcome of a historical process unfolding over millennia—one shaped by enduring economic, political, and cultural ties between the Central Plains and surrounding regions.
How, then, did the concept of “China” persist through these shifts? Historically, China existed both as a factual and conceptual entity. As a concept, it became increasingly entrenched and widely accepted. “China” came to embody legitimacy and unity. During periods of division, rival regimes each claimed to be “China,” while discrediting their opponents. Tan observed that during the Southern and Northern Dynasties, the southern courts branded the northern regimes as “barbarians,” and vice versa—yet both asserted themselves as the rightful China. After reunification, such polemics faded. “Tang Dynasty people no longer thought this way,” Tan explained. “They regarded both sides as part of China. Li Yanshou [a renowned Tang Dynasty historian], in compiling the Histories of the Northern and Southern Dynasties, treated them equally as parts of the Chinese historical narrative.” Similarly, during the Yuan Dynasty, earlier regimes such as Khitan-led Liao, Jurchen-led Jin, Tangut-led Western Xia, and Song were all regarded as Chinese regimes. Throughout these recurring cycles of division and unification, the concept of “China” has consistently been associated with and supported by the ideal of unity. Even during periods of fragmentation, the idea of “China” did not disappear—it remained a deeply revered aspiration. Over time, the concept of “China” gradually came to embody the core values of civilization.
Tan selected the Qing Dynasty’s mid-18th century to the 1840s territorial extent as the standard for mapping historical China because, in his view, “only the Qing Dynasty encompassed the entirety of China in history. There were no other competing ‘Chinese’ regimes during that time. In all other historical periods, there were always two or more coexisting regimes. We cannot say one was China and the other was not. Such distinctions are neither accurate nor useful.” This view—“we cannot divide them like that”—is a central tenet of Tan’s thinking and remains key to understanding historical Chinese geography.
Central Plains and non-Han regimes
Equating the Central Plains dynasties with “China” is incorrect. This distinction offers a compelling argument for understanding China as a multi-ethnic nation. Even during times of political fragmentation, the various regimes that existed across the territory were all part of China. Moreover, reunification was sometimes achieved by non-Han groups, underscoring the fact that China was built collectively by many ethnicities.
Tan emphasized that this joint creation was not a vague assertion—the contributions of ethnic minority groups, especially the Mongols and Manchus, were immense. “Imagine China in the 12th century divided into seven or eight parts: the Southern Song ruled the Yangtze and Pearl river regions, the Jin ruled the northeast and Yellow River basin, Western Xia controlled the area spinning the Hexi Corridor and Ordos, Dali State ruled Yunnan, the Western Liao held Xinjiang, Xizang was ruled by the Tubo, and the Mongolian Plateau was split among Mongol and Turkic tribes.”
Tan pointed out that the Yuan Dynasty’s rule brought together the various regions of China after a long period of division. “Without the Mongols, how could such a vast unification have been achieved? If the state of fragmentation had continued, the consequences would be unimaginable.” “Likewise, if it had not been for the over 200 years of efforts by six generations of Qing leaders—from Nurhaci and Hong Taiji to Emperor Shunzhi, Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong—the great unification of the 18th century would not have occurred. Therefore, we say that China was built through the collective efforts of all its ethnic groups.”
Regarding this 18th-century unification, Tan reiterated that the territorial scope does not reflect military conquest by the Qing: “it is the result of millennia of close economic and political ties between the Central Plains and frontier regions.” This outcome was historically contextual—its foundation lay in economic interdependence and cultural integration. Still, as Tan added, “close economic and cultural ties also require political unification for consolidation.”
Ancient Chinese dynasties did not operate on a market economy, nor did them possess an independent market mechanism capable of sustaining exchange on its own. Within such a social structure, all forms of exchange—particularly economic—relied on political institutions to be initiated, maintained, and stabilized. This dependence on political structures was an internal force driving the historical trend toward increasing political integration.
The standard proposed by Tan for determining the territorial scope of ancient China was originally intended to guide the design and arrangement of content in historical maps. However, through careful deliberation, reflection, and elaboration on this standard, he ultimately resolved a core problem in historical geography. As one of the pioneers of modern historical geography in China, Tan earned widespread respect in the academic community for his accurate grasp of historical development.
Tang Xiaofeng is a professor from the College of Urban and Environmental Sciences at Peking University.
Edited by REN GUANHONG