Legal Constitutions and the Economy: A Comparison of Early Modern England and China
International Social Science Journal (Chinese Edition)
No.3, 2024
Legal Constitutions and the Economy: A Comparison of Early Modern England and China
(Abstract)
Craig Muldrew
Previously, institutional economists have attributed Western economic growth primarily to democratic institutions; however, from a social history perspective, a comparison of early modern England and China reveals that the legal system was an important part of the state’s establishment of authority, and that the ordinary people made comprehensive use of a suite of dispute resolution mechanisms, including the courts, to deal with debt disputes. In this way the ordinary people would develop a sense of legal awareness, and they would expect the law to provide institutional security for their dispute resolution, which could lead to economic savings in transaction costs. By the 18th century, the formalization of the credit market in England had intensified, and a new type of public court was established to deal with debt litigation. Laws are not just rules, they are the way in which social relations are organized. Institutional arrangements are not only about economic growth, but also about how different members of society participate in the economy.