Children celebrate their kindergarden graduation at Xihuyuan Park, Shunyi Disctrict, Beijing, on July 3. PROVIDED TO CSST

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Population aging and a declining birthrate are demographic phenomena with far-reaching implications for the sustainability of socioeconomic development. Population governance in China has returned to a model in which individuals make choices together with their families. When facing negative population growth, how should policymakers or policy researchers adapt to this trend? What policy adjustments can be made? In regard to fertility support and family planning incentives, are there boundaries that institutional arrangements cannot overcome, such as the elasticity of the culture itself? Does the definition of a “fertility-friendly” society have multiple interpretations in different social environments? In any case, the practice of discussing fertility, for the sake of fertility itself, may be outdated.

Family planning policy 

The current low childbirth level in China is the result of low fertility rates and low interest in expanding family sizes. The gap between the two, and the existence of a “fertility deficit,” means that there are still some family planning needs that have not been met, leaving a window of opportunity for society to provide family planning support. Among the general public, the reasons to not have children could be summarized as people who “cannot afford children,” “cannot procreate,” or “do not want to have children.”

Those “who cannot procreate” are a group of people who are marginalized because they usually have a strong desire to have children but are infertile either due to physical or identity reasons.

Over the past decade, the government, on central and local levels, has continuously introduced a range of policies which support family planning. These policies aimed to overcome the “fertility deficit” as much as possible, targeting people who hesitate to expand their families for the first two reasons listed above. From a policy perspective, support of larger families happens in two ways: by loosening control over family planning restrictions or by introducing incentives. This includes removing obstacles and constraints at the institutional level, introducing an inclusive family planning policy, and offering guiding support and services by drafting an “active” family planning policy.

The relaxation of China’s strict family planning policy is mainly seen in the national changes made to the one-child policy, as well as the increasingly simplified processes and procedures related to childrearing and hukou registration in some local districts. The incentives refer mainly to the supportive policies in the form of providing subsidies, extending maternal and paternal leave, and enhancing childcare services. In this policy toolbox, studies have found that these policies do have a positive effect on childbirth rates, but the overall effect of these individual measures are rather limited. However, the combined use of these policies has a much stronger effect, signaling that the reasons behind people’s reproductive choices are complex.

In other words, whether a policy is designed to be family-oriented or individual-oriented, birth incentives do not generate results without serious national support. The government’s new active family planning policy is having positive results in the short term, however, this policy might not function as intended in the long run. As individuals and families have more freedom to make reproductive choices, we must recognize that certain institutional boundaries cannot be bypassed.

People-centered approach

Some scholars have observed that China’s policy tools have shifted from mandatory regulations, such as legal interventions, administrative punishment, and economic mechanisms, towards advocacy and encouragement with public services and incentives. The biggest social change brought about by this policy shift is that the government has receded into the background, granting individuals and their families the right to control family planning decisions. Thus, policymakers and researchers first need to shift their policy focus from “populations” to “people” before any progress can take place. After all, a population is not simply data on the map of economic and social development, nor is it a labor force, or mouths to feed, but a group of people full of ideas, desires, and different interests.

When we shift the focus from a “population” to “people,” it naturally brings the family behind these words to the fore. However, policymakers may miss that today’s “family” is no longer the same unit they previously understood. The two major functions of the traditional Chinese family — “carrying on the family line” and “raising children to support their elders”— have somewhat lost their meaning in contemporary society. 

Although academics in China are still debating whether the nation will experience a second demographic transition in the Western sense, some typical characteristics such as the delayed age of first marriage, declining marriage rates and childbirth rates, the rise in cohabitation rates and divorce rates have all made headlines in China during the 21st century.

All of this means that national policies to restrict or support childbirth need to address the changes of modern families, to understand and adapt to the diverse forms of families that have changed reality and public conceptions, rather than avoid or try to correct them. The government may be in a position similar to parents, in that they have no choice but to proactively release their control and quietly support these changes, because marriage and procreation, though not purely private practices, always have boundaries that institutions cannot overcome. The boundaries themselves are shaped by cultural resilience. 

In recent years, academia and the media have been keen to discuss practical reasons for the younger generation’s “fear of marriage and fear of childbearing,” which offers a good perspective to focus in on “people” and examine the family planning crisis. Moreover, when the government loosens restrictions on family planning or introduces supportive policies on all levels, this is also based on a utilitarian rational assumption. As such, these policies are intended to reduce the cost of childbirth or childrearing, and boost people’s confidence to have children through the supply of policy supports and services.

However, we may need to think outside the box, because for many young people today, they might not need a reason to avoid marriage or childbirth, but they will need good reasons to choose to make commitments and decide to have children. This problem is difficult to ignore, even after the focus of family plannings issues shifts to “people.” It is crucial that China builds a fertility-friendly policy support system. However, whether these policies will ultimately stimulate public interest to start families and relieve the childbirth crisis depends on whether our society is truly friendly to childbearing and childrearing.

A ‘fertility-friendly’ society

In July 2022, a total of 17 government departments jointly released a guideline for supportive policies in finance, taxes, housing, employment, education, and other fields to create a fertility-friendly society. This demonstrates a focus on “people” and families in social policies, and a major transformation from macro control to micro services, in order to encourage families to have more children.

Notably, fertility-friendly policies are different from having a fertility-friendly society, and the latter contains richer and more profound connotations. A fertility-friendly policy hopes to dispel the concerns of those who cannot afford to have children by offering various services to new parents, newborns, and their extended families, to help bridge the “birthrate deficit” as much as possible. 

Some scholars distinguish between the “supportive family policy” and the “incentive family policy” in their studies, arguing that though the two target groups are the same, the former focuses on people, while the latter focuses on the birthrate. Though there is no clear boundary between the two, it remains to be seen whether their implementation may be disproportionately gender biased. However, to say the least, this indicates that fertility-friendly policies may have different outcomes due to different practices or intentions.

By comparing international experiences, some scholars noted that the effect of incentives on China’s rebounding birthrate may be very limited. One of the reasons is that the existing support measures excessively focus on those who cannot afford to have children, but overlook those who cannot have children due to fertility issues, those who do not want to have children, and those who are not allowed. As a result, measures to stimulate the birthrate will ultimately fail to achieve its desired effect. 

When non-marital cohabitation, divorce, and single life are normalized, and when China’s sociology has extended family types to include unmarried cohabitating families, divorced families, single-parent families, families with dual incomes and no children, and other non-traditional family units, it means that the consistency between gender, marriage, family, and childbirth has been disconnected from traditional understandings. Therefore, in addition to providing supportive family policies, we must adopt inclusive family policies that remove as many institutional barriers to childrearing as possible, otherwise it will not be possible for the benefits to truly reach the whole population. The core of the inclusive family policy is to accept the diversification of family forms, brought about by diversification in marriage and childbearing concepts, so that reproductive autonomy can truly return to individuals and their families.

The in-depth meaning of a fertility-friendly society is that we cannot simply equate it to a society that can provide adequate support services for childbearing parents and their families, but a society that can free women and families from childbearing troubles. In other words, no matter what marriage and family type people choose, regardless of whether they choose to have children, when they choose to do so, and how they do it, people can find their own pace and space in society without discrimination and interference. If the government provides a diverse “menu” for people to “order” from of their own free will and ability, then individuals and families will need to pay for their own choices, allowing both parties to jointly complete the task of “cooking the dish.” Such an open and inclusive society may be the answer in the long run to ease modern anxieties associated with marriage and childbearing, reverse the low rates of marriage and childbearing, and make room for people to enjoy their own lifestyles. 

Ultimately, we need to build a society in which hesitant young people can find their own reasons to have children — their reason will come from the freedom to choose, but no matter how they choose, society will accept them — so that when they meet their unborn children, they will know in their hearts they made no mistakes in their choices.

Wu Xiaoying is a research fellow from the Institute of Sociology at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 

Edited by YANG XUE