China Social Science Review

No.1, 2023

 

Empathy and Virtue from a Phenomenological Perspective

(Abstract)

 

Zhang Haojun

 

Emotionalist virtue ethics analyze the expression, basis and function of empathy in detail, but most of these analyses are based on the psychology of empathy developed by Theodor Lipps. Among the many misunderstandings that have emerged about Lipps’ theory are that empathy is imitation; empathy is projection; empathy is not only an emotional act of feeling, but also the result of this act; as a specific emotion, empathy is sympathy; and empathy is the basis of sympathy and as such is a necessary and sufficient condition for moral behavior. However, from the phenomenological point of view, empathy is essentially the knowledge or understanding of others; it is not the imitation of others, nor is it a projection of the self. Empathy is a neutral act of consciousness, not a specific emotion, and does not constitute a sufficient condition for sympathy or morality. In this regard, the shortcomings of Lipps’ psychology of empathy mean that it does not provide a real basis for emotionalist virtue ethics. Rather, it is the phenomenology of empathy that provides a more rational explanation for virtue ethics at the level of moral consciousness. In terms of how moral behavior is possible, rationalist ethics, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and emotionalist ethics are not mutually exclusive, but compatible and complementary.