Social Sciences in China (Chinese Edition)

No.12, 2017

Kantian Ethics from the Perspective of Cognitive Science

(Abstract)

Xu Yingjin and Liu Xiaoli

In Kantian ethics, the relationship between basic metaphysics and the presumptions of metaethics is the distinction between “ought to be” and “is.” The study of a new kind of ethics based on cognitive science and evolutionary theory is grounded in the weakening of this binary opposition. From the point of view of cognitive science, if Kant’s assertion about moral autonomy is correct, we should be able see in the human brain a “moral module” or “moral algorithm” that satisfies all the following conditions simultaneously: (a) being responsible for social intercourse rather than other tasks (such as the perception of physical objects or reflection on purely theoretical questions); (b) possessing operational characteristics that are “rational” rather than “emotional” or “intuitive”; and (c) possessing an ethical output that is clearly “altruistic” and free of “instrumentality” or “selfinterest.” However, comparative research on Kantian ethics and several major trends in cognitive research (such as the hypotheses of the “general problem solver” and “massive modular theory,”) indicates that there is little support for the existence of a “moral module” or “moral algorithm” from mainstream trends in cognitive science.