Discussions on theories of international relations are hard to go beyond realism and liberalism, especially when to discuss strategies and foreign policy.  The United States as the sole super power, what are the motivations of its grand strategy? How the U.S. maintain its hegemony while facing financial crisis? Christopher Layne is famous for grand strategy study, what are his comments on the above questions? 

 

“Great Power” should be able to convert latent power into tangible power

 

Chinese Social Sciences Today: Professor Layne, many thanks for you taking time to accept the interview with the Chinese Social Sciences Today.  You are noted as a Neo-realist in the area of international relations. How do you interpret the international relations from your perspective? What is a “power”?

Christopher Layne: The seminal work on neorealism (also known as structural realism) is Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979).  Neorealism holds that outcomes in international politics are shaped by the structure of the international political system.  That structure has two components: (1) the polarity of the international system - that is, the number of great powers; (2) and anarchy.  The number of great powers in the international system has an important effect on international politics.  International politics varies greatly depending on whether the system is unipolar (as it was from the end of the Cold War until about 2008), bipolar (the US/Soviet standoff during the Cold War), or multipolar (which was the norm in in international politics from the beginning of the modern international system (circa 1500 until 1945).  When neorealists use the term “anarchy,” they do not mean the international system is characterized by rampant disorder or chaos.  Rather, anarchy in international politics contrasts with the hierarchical nature of domestic politics within states.  Within states, there is a central authority that possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and has the power to make and enforce laws.  In the international political system, however, no such central authority exists.  There is no world government.  Hence, each state is on its own to assure its survival and security.  This means that the international system is a “self-help” system.  Consequently, international politics is inherently conflictive and competitive.

Neorealism is essentially a theory of how the behaviour of great powers is constrained by the structure of the international system.  Historically, the great powers have always been the most important players in international politics.  As Waltz pointed out, to be considered a great power, a state must score high on all of the following factors: population, economic strength (the key metric here is GDP), military power, natural resources, and the competence of its governing structure.  The last - often referred to as “state capacity” - is critical.  Having a large economy alone does not mean a state is a great power.  A state must have a government that can effectively extract wealthy from the nation’s economy and convert it into “hard” power.  Often states fail to make it into the great power ranks - or, if they do, cannot compete effectively against great power rivals - because they are unable to convert latent power (wealth and resources) into tangible power.

 

“Smart Power” aims to strengthening U.S. security

Chinese Social Sciences Today: In recent years, the term of “soft power” is more and more popular both in academic community and governmental documents. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton advocates “smart power” to assert the U.S. influence, what does “smart power” consist of? Why U.S. government raised “smart power” at this moment?

Christopher Layne: Actually, the concept of “soft power” was first advanced in 1991 by Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr.  In a series of subsequent books, he has continued to refine the concept.  When he introduced the concept in 1991, it was to counter the argument advanced by Paul Kennedy (in his important 1987 book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers), that the U.S. was in decline.  In addition to contesting Kennedy’s central argument that tangible U.S. power was declining, Nye claimed that Kennedy had overlooked other - intangible - sources of American power: the attractiveness of America’s democratic domestic political system and the ideals that underpin it, and American culture (Hollywood movies, Levi’s jeans, rock n’ roll, the affluence of the American way of life).  For Nye, soft power is about attractiveness and seduction.  It is about getting others to do what one wants without coercing them or bribing them.  This is not a very compelling argument, however.  Foreign policy decision making is mediated by domestic political institutions and bureaucracies, and filtered through the prism of the national interest.  There is very little evidence that states (or the policymakers who act in their name) make decisions because they “like” another state or its leaders.  A good historical illustration (and a cautionary one for the Obama administration) is President Woodrow Wilson’s tumultuous public reception when he visited Europe after World War I.  Wilson was lionized by masses of people in Western Europe who adored him for his liberal ideals and vision of a new - just and peaceful - world order.  However, this public adulation - the attraction to Wilson both as a man and as a symbol of American ideals - did not carry over into the negotiations at Versailles where the French leader Georges Clemenceau and British Prime Minister Lloyd George proved to be tenacious defenders of their respective states’ interests.

In 2007 Nye, along with his co-author Richard Armitage, also coined the concept of “smart power.”  Simply put, in their formulation hard (military) power + soft power = smart power.  As Nye and Armitage put it, smart power is :

An approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action.  Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s interests and values. 

Smart power is viewed by the U.S. foreign policy establishment as means of enabling the United States to prevail in the contest with Islamic fundamentalism.  As such it involves policies that are not much different from those of the George W. Bush administration’s agenda of nation-building, democratization, and development. 

According to policymakers and analysts, basing U.S. strategy on smart power is not altruistic.  Rather, they, it is a matter of enhancing U.S. security because when people in other countries lack economic opportunity, or are denied avenues for political participation, the result is failed states that cause instability and conflict - and become safe havens for Islamic fundamentalist terror groups like Al Qaeda.   U.S. policymakers increasingly recognize that military force alone is insufficient to enable the U.S. to prevail in conflicts such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Thus, as former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has said, U.S. efforts must also address “economic development, institution building, the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good or at least decent governance [and] public services...” .  Reduced to its fundamentals, smart power is about promoting democracy and good governance, and economic development in the expectation that by doing so the United States can remove the grievances that fuel terrorism, and the kind of instability that causes states to fail.

Labeling a policy as “smart” power does not necessarily make it either wise or intelligent, however.  It is evident that U.S. policymakers have failed to learn learned some important lessons about the limits of the United States’ power.  When it comes to spreading democracy and good governance, and promoting economic development, there is considerable evidence that the U.S. lacks the capacity to achieve these objectives.  With respect to democracy promotion, as former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft correctly has observed: “The reason I part company with the neocons is that I don’t think in any reasonable time frame the objective of democratizing the Middle East can be successful.  If you can do it, fine, but I don’t think you can, and in the process of trying to do it you can make the Middle East a lot worse.”

 

Offshore balancer follows a strategy of devolution
 

Chinese Social Sciences Today: You have made great research on “off-shore” balance theory.  In your articles, you argued because of the declining of the power, the U.S. should take offshore balancing strategy.  What does this strategy mean regarding to East Asia?

Christopher Layne: Continental great powers in Eurasia do not have the luxury of being offshore balancers.  Great powers separated by water from Euraisa -  do have the option of being offshore balancers.  Offshore balancers can afford to stand on the sidelines of security competitions in Eurasia and leave it to the Eurasian great powers to maintain regional balances of power.  Only if it appears that regional balances in Eurasia will hold and there is the prospect of a single great power attaining hegemony in Eurasia do they need to intervene.  This was Britain’s strategy during its 18th and 19th century heyday as a great power.  Offshore balancers intervene to prevent Eurasian hegemons because a dominant power in Eurasia might be able to mobilize the resources of Eurasia and challenge the offshore power.  Here, offshore balancing is based implicitly on the geopolitical theories of Sir Halford Mackinder.

Offshore balancing strategy aims to take advantage of the relative safety geography has conferred upon offshore great powers.  Because their first line of defence lies in the expectation that regional great powers in Eurasia will oppose a rising hegemon, the offshore balancer has strong incentives to follow a strategy of devolution.  That is, of shifting to the Eurasian great powers the costs and risks of opposing a rising hegemon.  For the U.S. today, in East Asia an offshore balancing strategy would be based on a retraction of the forward presence of U..S. military power from East Asia and a reliance on regional great powers.  Simply put, according to offshore balancing strategy, it is these other powers - not the U.S. - that should bear the primary responsibility for upholding a balance of power in Asia.

 

Chinese Social Sciences Today: With a series of actions in the last year, such as expanding military troops in Australia, first time attending the East Asia Summit as an official member, restarting the TPP, Secretary Clinton addressed in Foreign Policy to affirm the importance of the East Asia to the U.S.  All of this stirs concerns and debates in China.  Maybe you can give us a clear picture of U.S. grand strategy, is it truly shifting to the East part of the World?

 

Christopher Layne: The “pivot” to Asia is being driven by the realization that American grand strategy will increasingly be constrained by the daunting fiscal crisis that confronts the U.S.  Since the Cold War ended, the one consistent grand strategic thread uniting all four post Cold War U.S. administrations (beginning with President George H. W. Bush) has been to maintain America’s global hegemony in a unipolar system.  U.S. strategists are beginning to realize that  the U.S. will not be able to afford to maintain a dominant military presence in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.  This is because - with the shift of economic power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia - Asia is becoming the most important region of the world both economically and geopolitically.  So it is not surprising that the U.S. is concentrating its increasingly limited resources on this region, and that China has become the main strategic preoccupation of U.S. policymakers.

 

Grand strategically American Liberalism is muscular

Chinese Social Sciences Today: Exceptionalism and idealism are the labels that scholars like to use to describe the U.S. foreign policy. How do you comment the U.S. current foreign policy?  Is it idealism or realism? 

Christopher Layne: Simply put, U.S. foreign policy today, and historically, is both realism and Liberal internationalism (or as it is often termed, Wilsonianism - after Woodrow Wilson).  In U.S. foreign policy these concepts are fused together seamlessly.  Now its easy to say, as some realists do - notably John Mearsheimer - that Liberal Internationalism is simply grand strategic window dressing invoked by U.S. policymakers as a smoke-screen to mask the fundamentally realpolitik nature of American grand strategy.  However, the role of Wilsonian ideology in U.S. grand strategy cannot be dismissed so cavalierly - it is far too deeply entrenched in America’s political culture and foreign policy tradition for that.  In fact, the subtle interplay between Wilsonianism and realism is the hallmark of American grand strategy.  U.S. grand strategy defines U.S. national interests in terms of power, economic openness, and the promotion of U.S. ideals - which why it has been described by others as “liberal realism,” “national security liberalism,” or (as neoconservative pundit Charles Krauthammer puts it) “democratic realism.”  From the standpoint of realist theory these terms are seen - rightly - as oxymorons.  But that misses the point, because oxymoronic or not, these descriptions tell us something important about how policymakers think about U.S. grand strategy:  although, as realists know, the Liberal approach to IR theory is wrong-headed, when they incorporate Wilsonianism into grand strategy, American policymakers are - or, more accurately, believe they are - being hard-headed, not woolly-headed. 

Grand strategically American Liberalism is muscular - offensive - not “idealistic.”  It postulates cause and effect linkages about how the United States can gain security.  The spread of democracy, and of economic openness, are imbedded in American grand strategic thought because policymakers believe U.S. power, influence, and security are fostered in an world shaped by America’s ideology, institutions, and values.  Wilsonianism holds out the promise of peace for the United States.  However,, this is a peace of illusions.  Far from causing peace, and enhancing U.S. security, Liberal Internationalism is the motor that has driven America’s post-1945 quest for hegemony in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.  As such, Wilsonian ideology is potent generator of American over-expansion, and of unnecessary military entanglements abroad.  In other words, grand strategically Wilsonianism’s consequence is to make the United States less, not more, secure.

 

Chinese Social Sciences Today: When we talk about liberal internationalism, automatically we will think about Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), what is your comments on DPT?

 

Christopher Layne: The origins of what today is known as the “Democratic Peace Theory” (DPT) have their roots in classical Liberal political philosophy.  This idea (and its counterpart, the claim that economic interdependence causes peace) were deeply held by British Liberals in the 19th century.  The DPT became an explicit cannon of foreign policy during World War I when British Liberals (including the two wartime prime ministers, H. H. Asquith and David Lloyd George), and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, all blamed the war on the fact the Wilhelmine Germany was - allegedly - a reactionary monarchy governed by an autocratic and militaristic elite.  Had Germany been a liberal democracy (like the U.S. or Britain), they argued, World War I would not have happened. Consequently, one of the main war aims of the U.S. and Britain was to bring about “regime change” in Germany and replace the Hohenzollern monarchy and the miliary aristocracy with a democratic government.

 

Beginning in the 1980s, Liberal International Relations scholars have tried to articulate a theoretical framework to support the idea imbedded in Liberal ideology that democracies are inherently peaceful and do not fight other democracies.   These efforts attained great notoriety in U.S. academic circles.  And, because the Liberalism is the hegemonic ideology in American domestic politics, the DPT resonated with policy makers as well.  A good example was the Clinton administration’s national security strategy of “engagement and democratic enlargement” and the George W. Bush administration’s policy of attempting democratic transformation in the Middle East.  Nevertheless, there is a lot less to the DPT than meets the eye.  Indeed, it is perhaps the most over-hyped and under-supported theoretical construct to emerge from U.S. social science.  As I argued in my 1994 article - “Kant or Cant? The Myth of the Democratic Peace” - in the journal International Security, the DPT is wrong.  In fact, democracies have gone to war against other democracies (the war in 1914 between Britain and France on one side versus Germany on the other being a good example because, in fact, Wilhelmine Germany was a democracy).  Also, there have been numerous examples of crisis between democratic states that went to the brink of war.  In each of those instances, the DPT does not explain why war was avoided.  Rather, realism - realopolitik and the balance of power - explain why war was avoided.

 

The origins of what today is known as the “Democratic Peace Theory” (DPT) have their roots in classical Liberal political philosophy.  This idea (and its counterpart,  the claim that economic interdependence causes peace) were deeply held by British Liberals in the 19th century.  The DPT became an explicit cannon of foreign policy during World War I when British Liberals (including the two wartime prime ministers, H. H. Asquith and David Lloyd George), and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, all blamed the war on the fact the Wilhelmine Germany was - allegedly - a reactionary monarchy governed by an autocratic and militaristic elite.  Had Germany been a liberal democracy (like the U.S. or Britain), they argued, World War I would not have happened.  Consequently, one of the main war aims of the U.S. and Britain was to bring about “regime change” in Germany and replace the Hohenzollern monarchy and the miliary aristocracy with a democratic government.

 

Beginning in the 1980s, Liberal International Relations scholars have tried to articulate a theoretical framework to support the idea imbedded in Liberal ideology that democracies are inherently peaceful and do not fight other democracies.   These efforts attained great notoriety in U.S. academic circles.  And, because the Liberalism is the hegemonic ideology in American domestic politics, the DPT resonated with policy makers as well.  A good example was the Clinton administration’s national security strategy of “engagement and democratic enlargement” and the George W. Bush administration’s policy of attempting democratic transformation in the Middle East.  Nevertheless, there is a lot less to the DPT than meets the eye.  Indeed, it is perhaps the most over-hyped and under-supported theoretical construct to emerge from U.S. social science.  As I argued in my 1994 article - “Kant or Cant? The Myth of the Democratic Peace” - in the journal International Security, the DPT is wrong.  In fact, democracies have gone to war against other democracies (the war in 1914 between Britain and France on one side versus Germany on the other being a good example because, in fact, Wilhelmine Germany was a democracy).  Also, there have been numerous examples of crisis between democratic states that went to the brink of war.  In each of those instances, the DPT does not explain why war was avoided.  Rather, realism - realopolitik and the balance of power - explain why war was avoided.

 

U.S. is in relative decline

 

Chinese Social Sciences Today: As you know, whether the U.S. on decline or not is a question for most readers. Is the U.S. truly declining? What the world order will be displayed in future?

Christopher Layne: Yes, the U.S. is in relative decline.  Of course one would never know it from the statements of the American political class.  In his 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama said that “anyone who tells you America is in decline doesn’t know what he’s talking about.”  Republican nominee Mitt Romney has declared that the 21st century will be the next American century and stated that he is opposed to decline in all its manifestations.  And Jon Huntsman, who served as U.S. ambassador to China until returning home to run unsuccessfully for the Republican presidential nomination said that, “Decline is un-American.”

 

We need to be careful when we use the word “decline” and to avoid sensationalism.  It is also important to use the correct metrics to define what decline is.  But fundamentally, Paul Kennedy was correct in his important 1987 book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.  In that book, he did not predict a sudden, catastrophic collapse of American power.  Rather, he argued that decline would be a gradual, multi-decade process.

 

To argue that the U.S. is not in decline is a perverse form of denialism.  China has surpassed the U.S. as the world’s leading manufacturer.  Since the 1970s, the U.S. has shifted from being a creditor nation to being the world’s largest debtor nation, and has run persistent balance of payments deficits.  For most years since the early 1960s, the U.S. has run federal budget deficits with the consequence that today its national debt is skyrocketing.  Moreover, today few serious thinkers about American strategy deny that China is on the cusp of being a “peer competitor” of the U.S. geopolitically.  This, in itself, is confirmation of U.S. decline.  After all, in 1990, the American political class was: proclaiming the advent of an enduring unipolar world in which the U.S. would be without   rivals; comparing U.S. power to that of the Roman Empire at its zenith; and simultaneously declaring the “end of history.”  We are a long way past those days now.  Still, we should not exaggerate.  While the U.S. soon will no longer be the “sole superpower” and its ability to shape international outcomes is diminishing markedly, “decline” does not mean the end of American power and influence in international politics.  The U.S. will remain one of several great powers - and possibly the leading one.  It still will have power and influence - just a lot less than it did in 1945 or 1990.

 

No one can foresee exactly what the future world order will look like.  But it’s a safe bet that over the next several decades the world order that emerges will look quite different from the world order that the U.S. built in the aftermath of World War II.  Although waning, the Pax Americana endures.  But is doubtful that the U.S. will be able to sustain in much longer.  The new powers in international politics - especially China - will have a big voice in determining what the next world order will looks like and we should expect that it will be an order that reflects the interests, norms and values of the rising powers more than it does those of a U.S. in decline.  

 

Future of Sino-American relations is gloomy

Chinese Social Sciences Today: This year is the election year in the U.S., meaning President Obama has worked in the White House for four years, did President Obama meet voters’ expectation? What’s your anticipation of the election result?

Christopher Layne: If I had the answer to this question, I would be in Las Vegas or Monte Carlo winning a fortune at the roulette table.  The outcome of the U.S. election is too close to call.  Rightly or wrongly, many voters hold President Obama’s administration responsible for the persistent high unemployment rate and for the weak economy.  On the other hand, Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate is deeply flawed.  And Romney’s selection of Paul Ryan as his running mate means that the Republicans are running a campaign pitched to very conservative voters.  It will be an interesting and hard fought campaign between now and November, and, as I already said, the margin of victory for the winner is likely to be razor thin.  So, in a sense, the real question is less whether Obama or Romney wins, than whether the election’s outcome leaves the U.S. in a continuing state of political gridlock and unable to deal with its fiscal and economic problems.

Chinese Social Sciences Today: I am sure it is not surprising that I ask the question of the U.S.-China relations.  Can we say the importance of the bilateral relations between these two countries are rising to a history high in very recent years? What’s your comment on the U.S.-China relations?

Christopher Layne: The Sino-American relationship doubtless will be the central geopolitical relationship in international politics in the first half of the 21st century..  I am not optimistic about how it will turn out, however.  The problem is that the United States has been the incumbent hegemon in East Asia since the end of 1945.  It shows no signs that it will yield this role.  Indeed, the Obama “pivot” underscores the U.S. determination to maintain its leading role in in East Asia.  So China and the U.S. are on what looks like a collision course, and the dynamics of this relationship could uncomfortably mirror those of the pre-1914 Anglo-German relationship.  Really, how this turns out will be determined more by the Washington’s decisions than by Beijing’s.  The choice for the U.S. is whether to gracefully accommodate China’s rise or whether to attempt perpetuate U.S. dominance in the region.  There is nothing in the American political culture or sense of national identity that suggests the U.S. will step-back from East Asia and acknowledge China’s regional dominance.  If this is true, then its hard to be anything but very gloomy about the future of Sino-American relations.