Social Sciences in China (Chinese Edition)

No. 12, 2024

The Issue of Intuition in Metaethics

(Abstract)

Ge Siyou

Previous metaethics research has predominantly focused on understanding and resolving theoretical disagreements from an argumentative standpoint, with less attention given to the role of intuition in theoretical justification. Two critical issues must be clarified with respect to intuition. First, which core intuitions are most valued: those that reflect the spirit of scientism, or those that embody anti-moral nihilism? Second, what role does intuition play in theoretical justification: does it provide conclusive justification, prima facie justification, or pro tanto justification? In the early stages of metaethical inquiry, intuition was largely regarded as offering conclusive justification. Theories grounded in one type of intuition often rejected or ignored the other, placing them in opposition. By the mid-stage, intuition was treated as offering prima facie justification, with efforts to explain or resolve one type of intuition through the other, thereby initiating a process of mutual understanding. In the later stages, intuitions came to be seen as providing pro tanto justification, progressively revealing their compatibility and culminating in a stage of mutual acceptance.