Examining meritocracy trap in Chinese context

BY LIU CHENG, YU XIULAN and YUNRUXIAN | 11-14-2024
Chinese Social Sciences Today

University students taking an exam Photo: TUCHONG


The concept of meritocracy can be understood in both a narrow and a broad sense. Narrowly, it specifically refers to a system of governance. Broadly, it has become shorthand for justice in the distribution of social resources. Recently, this term has been trending when used in the broader sense, to imply that resources are acquired based on controllable personal factors such as ability and effort, rather than social background. Therefore, achievements are what an individual “deserves.” This can be reduced to the simple formula: “ability + effort = success.” Typical examples of success include the allocation of educational resources, particularly placement within higher education institutions, and distribution of economic resources. This study takes the broad interpretation of meritocracy and confines it to the realm of higher education.


Common sense dictates that after the world progressed beyond the rigid social stratification of the aristocratic era, societal change would proceed according to a logical “industrialization hypothesis”—as industrialization levels rise, personal agency will grow stronger and the impact of family background on individual achievements will grow weaker, leading to a more meritocratic society. However, data trends on a global scale show that as industrialization increases, so does inequality.


Case study

Meritocracy obscures an ideological trap, over-reliance on the “industrialization hypothesis” ensnares those seeking upward mobility while overlooking the “reproduction hypothesis” which finds that inequality levels are reproduced based on social background. At its core, meritocracy is inherently biased toward individualistic attribution, the ideological belief that “ability + effort = success” obscures the roles of social background and luck. This individualistic bias assumes that personal ability is entirely controllable and thus deserved. 


Even personal ability is largely shaped by innate, uncontrollable factors. Meritocracy sets a moral trap by denying the true relationship between talent and luck, leading winners to have an exaggerated belief in their own ability and losers to feel humiliated, resentful, or inadequate. This sentiment feeds moral outrage and anti-elitist populism, making it impossible to build solidarity, a sense of common good, or to recognize that everyone is part of a shared community. In the United States, a meritocratic ideology has drawn society into a spiral of mutual recrimination among social classes. The discontented lower classes turn to populism seeking to expose the myth of meritocracy, particularly within higher education’s selection mechanisms, and the false promise of the American Dream. This has triggered a chain of causalities—from democratic backsliding to political polarization and anti-globalization.


However, it is worth asking whether it is appropriate to directly cite foreign scholars’ works when investigating whether a meritocracy trap exists in China. Would meritocracy in China lead to similar social traps and the same chain of causalities described by Michael Sandel and others? To answer this question, it is first necessary to discuss the particularities of a Chinese meritocracy. Second, solid empirical research must provide real evidence, rather than using foreign literature to support comparative arguments. The college entrance exam (gaokao) is a typical example of a meritocratic practice, and serves as an entry point for studying the meritocratic trap in China. Only by understanding the experiences of different groups of students within the highly stratified gaokao can researchers “see the big picture” and gain insight into the true nature of meritocracy in China.


A systematic literature review identified key research parameters, suggesting that the meritocracy trap can be measured by analyzing how upper and lower classes attribute success and the resulting feelings of moral distress or  superiority. Therefore, to examine the meritocracy trap in the context of China’s higher education system, this study compared the ways students from different backgrounds attributed the outcomes of their college entrance exams. This comparison was made without pre-written prompts or external moral pressure, reflecting the attribution patterns individuals intuitively adopt in everyday contexts. To remain unscripted, the study employed qualitative research methods. The sample was selected through purposive surveying of two main groups: urban students admitted to the top 10 universities in China (referred to as “elite students”) and rural students admitted to private second-tier colleges (referred to as “second-tier students”). 


The interviews were conducted through in-person meetings and online calls, with the collected data organized into four modules for analysis and coding. Each module resulted in a score calculated based on the degree of attribution. The four quadrants represent different modules: “elite students attributing results to others,” “elite students attributing results to themselves,” “second-tier students attributing results to themselves,” and “second-tier students attributing results to others.”


Findings and analysis

A comparison and synthesis of survey results revealed that individuals use different attribution patterns when evaluating the educational achievements of those below or above them. They tend to use individualistic factors to assess those below them and structural factors for those above them, while situational factors are often used when giving credit for their own outcomes. This means that the degree of structural attribution is not fixed but changes based on the relative position of the subject and the attributed target. This phenomenon was quantified as “differentiation between upper and lower groups.” The differentiation indicates structural attribution differences between student groups, potentially leading to tensions between them. Therefore, the variation in “differentiation between upper and lower groups” partially supports theoretical assumptions of the existence of a meritocracy trap.


Evidence of a meritocracy trap is present among both elite and second-tier students, though it is more pronounced among the elite group. First, when elite students attribute their own success, they tend to use situational explanations, giving credit to teachers, classes, family, and even luck, rather than the individualistic explanations which align with a meritocratic ideology such as effort and talent. However, when discussing the testing results of second-tier students, they often use an “unequal” individualistic explanation. Second, when elite students discuss structural factors, they often refer to their higher-status peers. The second-tier students also exhibit “differentiation between upper and lower groups” but to a lesser degree, as they tend to use “relationship-biased patterns” in their attributions. 


Logically, wide variation in perception between upper and lower groups indicates that the  attributions of these two groups can spark significant tension: elite students use individualistic attribution when explaining the outcomes of second-tier students, while second-tier students use situational attributions for themselves. When second-tier students attribute the success of elite students, they focus on structural factors, whereas elite students use situational explanations for themselves. This discrepancy perpetuates the divide between these groups.


Chinese understandings of merit

Returning to the main research question: what makes the meritocracy trap in China distinct from scenarios discussed by Western scholars such as Michael Young and Michael Sandel? While the meritocracy trap has been discussed by many scholars, the attribution bias embodied in the “differentiation between upper and lower groups” suggests that elite Chinese students do not wholly buy into the myth of meritocracy—that their success is solely a result of their personal ability and effort. The “arrogance of the elite” is more evident in their assumptions about second-tier students’ outcomes rather than their own. This is largely because elite students are socially trained to apply “isolation-biased patterns,” and the “modesty” mindset unique to Chinese culture. This somewhat mitigates exaggerated self-opinions. Therefore, while large differentiations in attribution patterns between upper and lower groups partially support the idea that meritocracy can foster “elite arrogance,” it is notably different from Western contexts.


The differentiation between upper and lower groups highlights differences in how student groups attribute their educational achievements, partially supporting the existence of a meritocracy trap. However, there is also significant attribution consensus among different student groups. Analysis reveals that students share clear consensus on the roles of family background, talent, and effort. On the one hand, as extolled by the mainstream meritocratic narrative, students emphasize the importance of personal effort. On the other hand, they also acknowledge the presence of innate factors such as background and talent, and they give these factors moral legitimacy by acknowledging that differences resulting from uncontrollable factors are justifiable. This idea can be referred to as “innate deservedness.” 


In surveys, students repeated their belief in “innate deservedness” which they attributed to three main factors: “naturalness,” “consequentialism,” and “ethical collectivism.” The concept of innate deservedness was shared by urban elite students, rural second-tier students, as well as rural elite students and urban second-tier students. It significantly differs from the notion of legitimacy in Western societies and forms one of the foundational beliefs underpinning meritocratic views in China. This belief fosters social cohesion, reduces resentment, and serves as a cultural buffer against the meritocracy trap, though it also harbors a potential cultural pitfall.


First, students from different backgrounds believe that personal differences stemming from innate factors are natural and therefore also “deserved.” Second, they tend to assess the legitimacy of benefits derived from talent and background based on outcomes—favoring a consequentialist rather than deontological understanding of justice. Lastly, during interviews, students often framed considerations of talent and background in terms of the benefits to their families, thus legitimizing the advantages accrued from these innate factors. The idea of “innate deservedness,” common among Chinese students, contrasts with beliefs held by Western societies. Analysis indicates that Chinese university students generally share a different belief system: anything passively acquired by individuals is “deserved” if it is natural. This differs from John Rawls’ notions of “desert” or “that which is deserved,” as it supplements personal merit the idea of “innate deservedness” which includes both talent and background within its scope.


While the emphasis on personal effort exists in both China and the United States, the concept of “innate deservedness” sets China apart. Although students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in China are acutely aware of structural factors—echoing findings from classic studies showing that Chinese people generally give credit to environmental influences for success—under the influence of “innate deservedness,” “bottom-level resentment” is largely mitigated and partially transformed into a work ethic emphasizing diligent effort. 


Particularly in the United States, the meritocracy trap collides with egalitarian ideals inherent in theories of justice, producing severe social tensions. In China, however, the cultural foundation supporting meritocracy is not based on egalitarian ideals of complete merit-based justice. It is broad enough to include the notion of “innate deservedness.” This belief helps cushion the social repercussions of the meritocracy trap.


Liu Cheng, Yu Xiulan (professor) and Yun Ruxian are from the Education Research Institute at Nanjing University.


Edited by WANG YOURAN